SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - IMPORTANT JUDGEMENTS WITH HEAD NOTES

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - IMPORTANT JUDGEMENTS WITH HEAD NOTES

Sl. No.	Title & Citation	HEAD NOTES
1	Jeet Ram Vs.  Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh, (2020) 06 SC CK 0003	Full Bench of the Supreme Court while agreeing with the finding of the High Court held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act is applicable only in the case of personal search, as such, there is no basis for the findings recorded by the trial court that there was non-compliance of provision under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Even with regard to the finding of the trial court that the case of the prosecution was not supported by independent witnesses, it is clear from the evidence on record that the incident had happened at about 10:30 p.m. in a dhaba which is away from the village site and all other persons who are found in the dhaba were the servants of the accused. It is also clear from the evidence on record that Suresh Kumar and Attar Singh examined on behalf of the appellant are closely related to the accused, as such, they could not be said to be independent witnesses. Pappu was the only other person who is none other than the servant of the dhaba and we cannot expect such a person to be a witness against his own master. Dealing with the issue of conscious possession, it is to be noticed that dhaba is constructed on the land which belongs to Kaushalya Devi who is none other than the wife of the accused. Further in deposition the PW-4 has stated that when the accused was questioned as to who was the owner of the dhaba, he claimed to be the owner. The case of the prosecution was found to be unnatural and improbable by the trial court only on the ground that 13 Kg. of charas was lying in open in a gunny bag. The trial court found that it is not believable that any person would keep such a huge quantity of charas in open condition. It is clear from the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the officials of NCB got information that trafficking of charas was going on in the area in question. Two police parties had left for Theog – one party headed by PW-4 R.P. Singh started earlier and second party headed by PW-1 Rakesh Goyal left a little later from Shimla. Thus the depositions of PW-4 R.P. Singh; PW-3 O.P. Bhat; PW-1 Rakesh Goyal and PW-2 Hayat Singh are consistent and trustworthy and cannot be said to be unnatural and improbable. Further it is also to be noted that the trial court has held that seal with which samples and remaining bulk of charas was sealed was handed over to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who himself gave the sample to PW-2 for carrying to Central Laboratory at Delhi and since the seals remained with the Director, the chances of tampering could not be ruled out. In this regard, it is to be noticed, as rightly held by the High Court, that the trial court totally lost sight of the fact that on 19.06.2001 JMIC, Theog had also appended his signatures on the samples as well as bulk parcels and, therefore, there was no chance of tampering of the samples. Further, there was no such suggestion of tampering either put to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal or to PW-2 Hayat Singh. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the clear view that the view taken by the trial court was not at all possible, having regard to the evidence on record and findings which are erroneously recorded contrary to evidence on record were rightly set aside by the High Court.
2	Abhilasha Vs.  Parkash & Ors, (2020) 09 SC CK 0021	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that as a preposition of law, an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself, for enforcement of which right her application/suit has to be under Section 20 of Act, 1956.The Full Bench  while upholding the orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Additional Sessions Judge in the revision held that the said order was not required to be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court viewed that the purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide immediate relief to applicant in a summary proceedings, whereas right under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956 contains larger right, which needs determination by a Civil Court, hence for the larger claims as enshrined under Section 20, the proceedings need to be initiated under Section 20 of the Act and the legislature never contemplated to burden the Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. to determine the claims contemplated by Act, 1956.
3	National Co-Operative  Development  Corporation  Vs.  Commissioner  Of  Income  Tax,  Delhi-V, (2020) 09 SC CK 0020	The Supreme Court, has recommended to the Central Government to consider the efficacy of the advance tax ruling system and make it more comprehensive as a tool for settlement of disputes. The bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Indu Malhotra observed that one of the largest areas of litigation for the Government is taxation matters and the petition rate of the tax department before the Supreme Court is at 87%. The court said that a vibrant system of Advance Ruling can go a long way in reducing taxation litigation.
4	Rizwan  Khan Vs. State Of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 09 SC CK 0017	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that to prove the case under the NDPS Act, the ownership of the vehicle is not required to be established and proved. It is enough to establish and prove that the contraband articles were found from the accused from the vehicle purchased by the accused. Ownership of the vehicle is immaterial. What is required to be established and proved is the recovery of the contraband articles and the commission of an offence under the NDPS Act? Therefore, merely because of the ownership of the vehicle is not established and proved and/or the vehicle is not recovered subsequently, trial is not vitiated, while the prosecution has been successful in proving and establishing the recovery of the contraband articles from the accused on the spot. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the decision of the Special Court and High Court and held that both the courts below have rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act. Full Bench held that they are in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Special Court and confirmed by the High Court and the conviction recorded by both the courts below. Full Bench did not find any reason to interfere with the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 20(b)(ii) (B) of the NDPS Act.
5	Pravin Kumar Vs. Union Of India And Ors, (2020) 09 SC CK 0016	Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that in their considered opinion, the appellant’s contention that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which prohibits State authorities from treating varying degrees of misdeeds with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such misconduct. [Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 11 SC CK 0082] But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly. Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear that the punishment of dismissal from service is far from disproportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication and intimidation which have unanimously been proven against the appellant. Taking any other view would be an anathema to service jurisprudence. If we were to hold that systematic corruption and its blatant cover up are inadequate to attract dismissal from service, then the purpose behind having such major penalties, which are explicitly provided for under Article 311 of the Constitution, would be obliterated.
6	Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil Vs. Chief Minister & Anr., (2020) 09 SC CK 0019	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Hon’ble Justice L. NAGESWARA Rao, Justice HEMANT GUPTA and Justice  S. RAVINDRA BHAT while referring the issue of Maratha Quota for admission in Educational and for appointments in Public Services and Posts to a Constitution Bench of Five Judges held that the factors termed as extraordinary and exceptional, justifying reservations in excess of 50 percent are those required for the purpose of providing reservations. The social, educational and economic backwardness of a community, existence of quantifiable data relating to inadequacy of representation of the community in public services and deprivation of the benefits flowing from reservations to the community are not exceptional circumstances for providing reservations in excess of 50 per cent. The Hon’ble Justices further stated that they are prima facie of the opinion that the High Court committed an error in treating the above factors as circumstances which are extraordinary, warranting relaxation of the strict rule of 50 per cent. Admittedly, reservations provided to the Maratha community were implemented in educational institutions for one academic year only. Implementation of the Act for admissions in educational institutions and appointments to public posts during the pendency of these Appeals will cause irreparable loss to the candidates belonging to the open category. It will be difficult to cancel the admissions made in the educational institutions and appointments made to the public posts by implementing the reservations as per the Act. In view of thereof the Hon’ble Judges passed the following orders: - (A) As the interpretation of the provisions inserted by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, these Appeals are referred to a larger Bench. These matters shall be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India for suitable orders. (B)   Admissions to educational institutions for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made without reference to the reservations provided in the Act. We make it clear that the Admissions made to Post-Graduate Medical Courses shall not be altered. (C)  Appointments to public services and posts under the Government shall be made without implementing the reservation as provided in the Act.
7	Shreyas Sinha Vs. West Bengal National University Of Juridical Sciences & Ors, (2020) 09 SC CK 0018	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences that the benefit of 30% Domicile reservation had been extended to the candidates by the Universities prospectively from the next Academic Session i.e. 2020-2021. Since there is no mandate in the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999 vide the Amending Act (which came into force with effect from 21st May 2019) to grant the benefit of reservation in the Academic Year 2019-2020, therefore, the University keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances has rightly held that the benefit of reservation would be extended from the next academic year as the admission process had already been initiated before coming into force of the Amending Act.
8	Stalin Vs. State Represented By The Inspector of Police, (2020) 09 SC CK 0014	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court Comprising of Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice R. Subhash Reddy and Justice M.R Shah held that as per Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In the present case, at the place of incident the beer was being served; all of them who participated in the beer party were friends, therefore, in the facts and circumstances, culpable homicide cannot be said to be a murder within the definition of Section 300 IPC and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case  and the manner in which the incident started in a beer party, the Full Bench opined  that Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted. Now, the next question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC? Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly that the accused inflicted the blow with a weapon like knife and he inflicted the injury on the deceased on the vital part of the body, it is to be presumed that causing such bodily injury was likely to cause the death. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
9	TRUSTEES OF H.C. DHANDA TRUST vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS, (2020) 09 SC CK 0029	A Fill Bench of the Supreme Court partly allowed the Appeal and modified the penalty imposed by Collector of Stamps from ten times  into five times penalty .The Full Bench in its judgement  expressed the view that the  purpose of penalty generally is a deterrence and not retribution. When a discretion is given to a public authority, such public authority should exercise such discretion reasonably and not in oppressive manner. The responsibility to exercise the discretion in reasonable manner lies more in cases where discretion vested by the statute is unfettered. Imposition of the extreme penalty i.e. ten times of the duty or deficient portion thereof cannot be based on the mere factum of evasion of duty. The reason such as fraud or deceit in order to deprive the Revenue or undue enrichment are relevant factors to arrive at a decision as to what should be the extent of penalty under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act 1899.The Supreme Court also opined that it was not the case of the Collector of Stamps that the conduct of the Appellant was dishonest  or contumacious.
10	Indrani Wahi Vs. Registrar Of Coop. Societies & Ors., (2016) 03 SC CK 0061	Supreme Court Ruled that the co-operative society cannot challenge the right of nominee. And for this,no legal heirship, court order or succession certificate or letter of administration is required.
11	Preet Pal Singh Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2020) 08 SC CK 0015	Supreme Court Set Aside the order passed by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow bench whereby the High Court granted bail to the accused husband of the deceased victim, convicted by a Judgment of the additional district and sessions judge for offences under sections 304B, 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sections 3 and 4 of the dowry prohibition act, 1961 staying execution of the sentences of imprisonment of the accused by holding that the failure to lodge an fir complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim, is in our considered view, inconsequential. The parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete break down of the marriage by lodging an fir against accused and his parents, while the victim was alive.
12	M. Arumugam Vs. Ammaniammal And Ors., (2020) 01 SC CK 0020	SUPREME COURT RULED THAT A DOCUMENT IN THE NATURE OF A RELEASE DEED OF A PROPERTY EXECUTED BY THE MOTHER AS NATURAL GUARDIAN ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR DAUGHTER CANNOT BE SAID TO BE A VOID DOCUMENT. AT BEST, IT WAS A VOIDABLE DOCUMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 8 OF THE ACT, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED WITHIN THREE YEARS OF THE MINOR ATTAINING MAJORITY, AND HENCE SC UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING A SUIT FILED BY SUCH MINOR ON ATTAINING MAJORITY BY HOLDING THAT THE MOTHER ACTED AS THE NATURAL GUARDIAN OF THE MINOR DAUGHTER AND NO STEPS WERE TAKEN BY THE PLAINTIFF ON ATTAINING MAJORITY TO GET THE RELEASE DEED SET ASIDE WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION
13	Union Of India & Anr Vs. M/S. K.C. Sharma & Co. & Ors., (2020) 08 SC CK 0016	SC RULED THAT DEFENCE UNDER SECTION 53A OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 IS AVAILABLE TO A PERSON WHO HAS AGREEMENT OF LEASE IN HIS FAVOUR THOUGH NO LEASE HAS BEEN EXECUTED AND REGISTERED. SIMILAR PROPOSITION IS ALSO APPROVED IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE SC IN THE CASE OF HAMZABI 11 WHEREIN THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT SECTION 53A OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 PROTECTS THE POSSESSION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE ACTED ON A CONTRACT OF SALE BUT IN WHOSE FAVOUR NO VALID SALE DEED IS EXECUTED OR REGISTERED. AS IT IS CLEAR THAT RESPONDENTS WERE PUT IN POSSESSION AND THE PANCHAYAT HAS ACTED UPON THEIR PROPOSAL FOR GRANT OF LEASE SAID CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS. HENCE WITH THESE REASONS, WE DO NOT FIND ANY MERIT IN THESE APPEALS SO AS TO INTERFERE WITH THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
14	Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah Vs. State Of Gujarat And Another, (2019) 01 SC CK 0103	SC Ruled that in a number of cases the SC has usually cautioned against criminalizing civil disputes,such as breach of contractual obligations [refer to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 09 SC CK 0145]. The legislature intended to criminalize only those breaches which are accompanied by fraudulent, dishonest or deceptive inducements, which resulted in involuntary and inefficient transfers, under Section 415 of IPC. SC further opined that the High Court may not be carried away by the moral element involved in the breach of promise and made certain observations. Being a policy consideration, such suggestions need to be restricted
15	Gajendra Sharma Vs. Union Of India & Anr., (2020) 09 SC CK 0011	SUPREME COURT IN AN INTERIM ORDER PROTECTED THOSE ACCOUNTS FROM BEING DECLARED AS NON-PERFORMING ASSETS (NPAS) WHICH WERE NOT CLASSIFIED AS NPAS ON AUGUST 31 TILL CASE IS FINALLY DISPOSED OFF.
16	M/S Bangalore Club Vs. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, & Anr., (2020) 09 SC CK 0013	Full Bench of Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the Karnataka High Court Ruled that the Bangalore Club is an association of persons and not the creation, by a person who is otherwise assessable, of one among a large number of associations of persons without defining the shares of the members so as to escape tax liability. For all these reasons, it is clear that Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act does not get attracted to the facts of the present case.
17	Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs & Ors, (2020) 07 SC CK 0003	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice Nageswara Rao and Justice Indu Malhotra while  imposing a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- on the Appellant, dismissed the Civil Appeal filed by the Appellant by holding that the  delay of over 5 and 1⁄2 years after the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was instituted on 15.12.2014, even though the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs. Civil Appeal No.2960/2019 decided on 13.03.2019 wherein this Court held the suit would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, if it was filed beyond three years of the execution of the registered deed
18	M/S. Centrotrade Minerals And Metals Inc. Vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2020) 06 SC CK 0002	Full Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Hon'ble Judges : R.F. Nariman, J;S. Ravindra Bhat, J;V. Ramasubramania allowed  the Civil Appeal filed by the Appellant by holding that remanding the matter to the ICC arbitrator to pass a fresh award is clearly outside the jurisdiction of an enforcing court under Section 48 of the 1996 Act. It was also held that though the Ld. Single Judge refers to the judgment in Hari Om Maheshwari (supra) as well as Minmetals (supra), but then does not proceed to apply the ratio of the said judgments. Had he applied the ratio of even these two judgments, it would have been clear that an arbitrator’s refusal to adjourn the proceedings at the behest of one party cannot be said to be perverse, keeping in mind the object of speedy resolution of disputes of the Arbitration Act. Further, the Minmetals (supra) test was not even adverted to by the Ld. Single Judge which is that HCL was never unable to present its case as it was at no time outside its control to furnish documents and legal submissions within the time given by the learned arbitrator. HCL chose not to appear before the arbitrator, and thereafter chose to submit documents and legal submissions outside the timelines granted by the arbitrator
19	Rajesh & Ors Vs. State Of Haryana, (2019) 05 SC CK 0006	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that since after the filing of the charge sheet, the court reaches the stage of inquiry and as soon as the court frames the charges, the trial commences, and therefore, the power under Section 319(1) Cr.PC can be exercised at any time after the charge sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment, except during the stage of Sections 207/208 Cr.PC, committal, etc.which is only a pretrial stage, intended to put the process into motion. This stage cannot be said to be a judicial step in the true sense for it only requires an application of mind rather than a judicial application of mind. At this pretrial stage, the Magistrate is required to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather than judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 Cr.PC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Therefore, it would be legitimate for us to conclude that the Magistrate at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 Cr.PC is forbidden, by express provision of Section 319 Cr.PC, to apply his mind to the merits of the case and determine as to whether any accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial before the Court of Session. It is thus aptly clear that until and unless the case reaches the stage of inquiry or trial by the court, the power under Section 319 Cr.PC cannot be exercised
20	Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors VS M/S Sunbeam High Tech Developers Private Ltd., (2019) 10 SC CK 0074	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that we make it clear that we do not approve the action of the Municipal Corporation or its officials in demolishing the structures without following the procedure prescribed by law, but the relief which has to be given must be in accordance with law and not violative of the law. If a structure is an illegal structure, even though it has been demolished illegally, such a structure should not be permitted to come up again. If the Municipal Corporation violates the procedure while demolishing the building but the structure is totally illegal, some compensation can be awarded and, in all cases where such compensation is awarded the same should invariably be recovered from the officers who have acted in violation of law. However, we again reiterate that the illegal structure cannot be permitted to be re-erected. The Bench further directed that the Registrar General of the Bombay High Court shall cause copies of this judgment to be served upon the Chief Secretary, State of Maharashtra as well as Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mumbai, Maharashtra, who will ensure that copy of this judgment is served upon all the municipal corporations in the entire State of Maharashtra
21	B. SANTOSHAMMA & ANR vs. D. SARALA & ANR., (2020) 09 SC CK 0034	A Bench of the Supreme Court Ruled that Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act is to be construed and interpreted in a purposive and meaningful manner to empower the Court to direct specific performance by the defaulting party, of so much of the contract, as can be performed. To hold otherwise would permit a party to a contract for sale of land, to deliberately frustrate the entire contract by transferring a part of the suit property and creating third party interests over the same. Section 12 has to be construed in a liberal, purposive manner that is fair and promotes justice. A contractee who frustrates a contract deliberately by his own wrongful acts cannot be permitted to escape scot free
22	Subhash Sahebrao Deshmukh Vs. Satish Atmaram Talekar And Others, (2020) 06 SC CK 0019	A division Bench of the Supreme Court held that in a revision petition preferred by the complainant before the High Court or the Sessions Judge challenging an order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 203 of the Code at the stage under Section. 200 or after following the process contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused or a person who is suspected to have committed the crime is entitled to hearing by the Revisional Court. In other words, where the complaint has been dismissed by the Magistrate under Section 203 of the Code, upon challenge to the legality of the said order being laid by the complainant in a revision petition before the High Court or the Sessions Judge, the persons who are arraigned as accused in the complaint have a right to be heard in such revision petition. This is a plain requirement of Section 401(2) of the Code. If the Revisional Court overturns the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint and the complaint is restored to the file of the Magistrate and it is sent back for fresh consideration, the persons who are alleged in the complaint to have committed the crime have, however, no right to participate in the proceedings nor are they entitled to any hearing of any sort whatsoever by the Magistrate until the consideration of the matter by the Magistrate for issuance of process. We answer the question accordingly. The judgments of the High Courts to the contrary are overruled.” The impugned orders dated 6.03.2009 and 08.10.2007 are held to be unsustainable in their present form. They are therefore set aside. The matter is remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Mumbai to hear the revision application afresh after notice to the appellant also and then pass a fresh reasoned and speaking order to his satisfaction
23	Ashoo Surendranath Tewari Vs. Deputy Superintendent Of Police EOW CBI & Anr., (2020) 09 SC CK 0031	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the Special Judge discharged the appellant from the offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by giving their opinion that the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court. The court also held that in case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases
24	Balasore Alloys Limited Vs. Medima LLC, (2020) 09 SC CK 0023	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that if there is a situation where there are disputes and differences in connection with the main agreement and also disputes in regard to “other matters” “connected” with the subject matter of the main agreement then in such a situation, in our view, we are governed by the general arbitration clause 39 of the main agreement under which disputes under the main agreement and disputes connected therewith can be referred to the same arbitral tribunal. This clause 39 no doubt does not refer to any named arbitrators. So far as clause 5 of the Interior Design Agreement is concerned, it refers to disputes and differences arising from that agreement which can be referred to named arbitrators and the said clause 5, in our opinion, comes into play only in a situation where there are no disputes and differences in relation to the main agreement and the disputes and differences are solely confined to the Interior Design Agreement
25	Government Of India Vs. Vedanta Limited & Anr., (2020) 09 SC CK 0024	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a Civil Appeal challenging the Judgment and Order passed by the Delhi High Court, wherein the application under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the Government of India has been dismissed held that the interpretation of the terms of the Contract (Production Sharing Contract) lies within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitration Award cannot be impeached on merits before the enforcement court. The enforcement court cannot re-assess or re-appreciate the evidence led in the arbitration. Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act does not provide a de facto appeal on the merits of the award. The enforcement court exercising jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, cannot refuse enforcement by taking a different interpretation of the terms of the Contract
26	State Of Kerala Etc Vs. Rajesh Etc., (2020) 01 SC CK 0070	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court while setting aside the Order of the Single Judge of the High Court granting bail to the accused under NDPS Act categorically held that the scheme of Section 37 of NDPS Act reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Cr.PC, but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37 of NDPS Act which commences with non­obstante clause. The operative part of section 37 of NDPS Act. is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of commission of an offence under the NDPS Act, unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and the second, is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 of NDPS Act that in addition to the limitations provided under the Cr.PC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for
27	M/S Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr Vs. Prasad Vassudev Keni Etc. Etc., (2020) 09 SC CK 0006	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the High Court dismissing the Writ Petition against the judgement of the Additional Sessions Judge allowing the revision petitions whereby the Additional Sessions Judge not only quashed the process issued by the Magistrate under sections 191,192 and 193 of the IPC but also quashed the two criminal complaints filed by the Appellants against the Respondents under Section 340 read with Section 195 in respect of offences alleged under Sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), which were converted to and treated as private complaints by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court opined that it seems to them that the baby and the bath-water have both been thrown out together. While it is correct to say that the order of conversion and issuing of process thereafter on a private complaint may not be correct, yet the two complaints as originally filed can still be pursued. Once the Magistrate’s order had been set aside, the learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have relegated the parties to the position before the original complaints had been converted into private complaints.Since this has not been done, we therefore, reinstate the two complaints in their original form so that they may be proceeded with further, following the drill of Sections 195 and 340 of the Cr.PC
28	M/S. MSD Real Estate LLP Vs. Collector Of Stamps & Anr, (2020) 09 SC CK 0027	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court Ruled that the orders and notices issued by the Municipal Corporation and other State Authorities subsequent to filing of the appeal, which have been brought on record subsequent to filing of the appeal are all subsequent actions which were not subject matter of the writ petition before the High Court and cannot be taken into consideration in the appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that subsequent notices, actions and orders, brought on record by an IA cannot be entertained in the appeal. However the parties are at liberty to seek such remedy with regard to subsequent actions and orders as is permissible in law
29	Karad Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Swwapnil Bhingardevay & Ors., (2020) 09 SC CK 0009	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court has set-aside the Order passed by the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT) vide which NCLAT has set aside the approval granted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to a Resolution Plan and have remanded the matter back to the NCLT with a direction to have the Resolution Plan re-submitted before the Committee of Creditors. The controversy related to the advertisement issued by the Resolution Professional on 30.03.2018. NCLAT holds that the advertisement was not in conformity with Regulation 36A of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 and as per Form G of the Schedule. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions reached by NCLAT in this regard cannot hold water for two reasons. If NCLAT was convinced that the very process of inviting Expression of Interest was vitiated, NCLAT should have issued a direction to start the process afresh all over again by issuing a fresh advertisement. NCLAT did not do this and the person who raised this point is not on appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that Regulation 36A was inserted only with effect from 06.02.2018 under Notification No. IBBI/2017 18/GN/REG024 dated 06.02.2018. It underwent a change under Notification No. IBBI/2018 19/GN/REG031 dated 03.07.2018, with effect from 04.07.2018. Regulation 36A, as it stood during the period from 06.02.2018 to 04.07.2018, did not mandate the publication of the invitation of Resolution Plans, either in Form G or otherwise, in newspapers. It is only the amended Regulation 36A, which came into effect from 04.07.2018, that requires the publication of Form G in newspapers. Therefore, the publication in newspapers made by the Resolution Professional, in the case on hand, on 30.03.2018, was something that was statutorily not required of him and hence the Promoter/Director of the corporate debtor cannot take advantage of the amendment that came later, to attack the advertisement. The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal and by setting aside the Order of the NCLAT, the Supreme Court restored the order of the NCLT
30	Lalan D. @ Lal & Anr Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd, (2020) 09 SC CK 0030	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that in the case of a finding that the victim is virtually lying as vegetable, the degree of disability is to be reckoned as 100% (i.e. permanent disability) for award of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The assessment of the monthly income of the victim is essentially a finding of question of fact to be looked into by the Tribunal / High Court which do not require to be disturbed by the Apex Court. The compensation is also to be awarded under the head of ‘loss of future prospects’ and in view of the 100% disability, 40% of the income of the victim can be considered as loss of future earnings.  This will be in addition to compensation to be awarded for permanent disability. The compensation under the heads ‘pain and suffering’ and towards ‘loss of amenities and enjoyment in life’ are also to be calculated inconsonance with the degree of disability. ‘Medical Attendant Charges’ (bystander expenses) and ‘Future Treatment Cost’ in the case of permanent disability are to be calculated keeping into view that the victim require caregiver round the clock and round the year so as to remain barely functional which may be awarded as lump sum compensation judging by the stratum of the society he comes from
31	M/S. L. R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd Vs. Commissioner Of Central Excise, (2020) 09 SC CK 0003	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing an appeal filed against the final order passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [For short, “CESTAT”] in Customs Appeal No. 9 of 2008, whereby the customs duty levied upon the appellant on the sale of cut flowers within the Domestic Tariff Area [For short, “DTA”] had been confirmed by the Tribunal, held that the Exim Policy 1997 2002  (Export Import Policy) provided that a 100% EOU in floriculture sector was permitted to sell 50% of its produce in DTA, subject to achieving positive net foreign exchange earning of 20% and upon approval of the Development Commissioner and failure to do so entitle the custom authorities to invoke provisions of section 28 of the custom act 1962. The Division Bench stated that in the fact situation of the present case, the appellant was issued a show cause notice mentioning that it had suppressed the DTA sales of cut flowers to evade payment of duty. Had the appellant in good faith believed that no duty was payable upon the DTA sales of cut flowers, it would have sought prior approval of the Development Commissioner, which it failed to do. Even in the letter seeking ex post facto approval, the appellant claimed that they had not used any imported input such as fertilizer, plant growth regulations, etc. in growing flowers sold in DTA, despite having imported green house equipment, raw materials like Live Rose Plants and consumables like planting materials and fertilizers. Therefore, it prima facie appeared that suppression by the appellant was “wilful”. The burden of proving to the contrary rested upon the appellant, which the appellant failed to discharge by failing to establish that the imported inputs were not used in the production of the cut flowers sold in DTA. In view thereof, the authorities below have rightly invoked Section 28 of the 1962 Act and allied provisions. Hence CESTAT has rightly upheld the levy of customs duty
32	National Alliance For People’s Movements & Ors. Vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors., (2020) 09 SC CK 0036	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition (Crl.) challenging the Order of the High Court in a PIL whereby the Petitioner sought a relief that the decision of the High Powered Committee (‘HPC’ for short) dated 25.03.2020 to the extent of Clauses (iii), (iv) and (vii) of paragraph 8, decisions/minutes of HPC meeting dated 11.05.2020 excluding certain categories of offences provided in paragraph 5(i) and 5(ii) for the purpose of grant of interim bail and corrigendum dated 18.05.2020 of the Minutes of the Meeting of HPC dated 11.05.2020 to the extent of clarification that the class and/or category of offences determined by the HPC for temporary release be not read as a direction made by it for mandatory release of such prisoners. The petitioners had also sought for a direction to the respondents to release the prisoners convicted for life imprisonment without insisting that they have been released in the past at least twice, either on furlough or parole While dismissing the SLP, the Supreme Court was of the view that it would still be open for the petitioners to obtain necessary statistics and if any modification of the guidelines is necessary in future, they will be at liberty to submit an appropriate representation to the HPC which would in that circumstance look into the same and arrive at a conclusion at its discretion depending on the need or otherwise to modify its guidelines. In that view, we are of the opinion that when such factual consideration to achieve the object alone is necessary and the HPC is constituted for the very purpose, interference in a judicial proceeding of the present nature to alter the criteria would not arise unless it is shown to be so arbitrary that no reasonable person can accept. But in circumstances where there is any individuous discrimination amongst the prisoners in same category and similarly placed, it would be open for the competent Court to examine the same to that limited extent when grievance is raised by the person who is denied the benefit if he/she is entitled to such benefit
33	Neetu Kumar Nagaich Vs. State Of Rajasthan And Others, (2020) 09 SC CK 0026	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while setting aside the Closure Report filed by the Police directed a de novo investigation by a fresh team of investigators to be headed by a senior police officer of the State consisting of efficient personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also. No officer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of the team conducting de novo investigation. The Supreme Court was of the view that normally when an investigation has been concluded and police report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code, it is only further investigation that can be ordered under Section 173(8) of the Code. But where the constitutional court is satisfied that the investigation has not been conducted in a proper and objective manner, as observed in Kashmeri Devi vs. Delhi Administration, (1988) 04 SC CK 0018, fresh investigation with the help of an independent agency can be considered to secure the ends of justice so that the truth is revealed. The power may also be exercised if the court comes to the conclusion that the investigation has been done in a manner to help someone escape the clutches of the law. In such exceptional circumstances the court may, in order to prevent miscarriage of criminal justice direct de novo investigation as observed in Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 08 SC CK 0006. A fair investigation is as much a part of a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution as a fair trial, without which the trial will naturally not be fair. The Supreme Court also referred to the observations in paragraph 45 in Babubhai (supra) that not only fair trial but fair investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious as it is the minimum requirement of rule of law. The investigating agency cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted and biased manner. Where non-interference of the court would ultimately result in failure of justice, the court must interfere. In such a situation, it may be in the interest of justice that independent agency chosen by the High Court makes a fresh investigation
34	National Co-Operative Development Corporation  Vs.  Commissioner Of Income Tax Delhi-V, (2020) 09 SC CK 0020	A Division Bench of the Supreme Court while allowing the Civil Appeal filed by the Appellant Corporation (National Co-Operative Development Corporation established under the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962) pronounced its Judgment with the opening remark “Which pocket of the Government should be enriched has taken forty-four (44) years to decide – a classic case of what ought not to be”. The question of law in the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court was “whether the component of interest income earned on the funds received under Section 13(1), and disbursed by way of “grants” to national or state level co-operative societies, is eligible for deduction for determining the “taxable income” of the appellant-Corporation”. The Judges stated that we are unable to accept the contention of the Revenue Department that merely because the interest income received has merged with the monies in the common Fund it loses its revenue character and becomes a capital receipt. This line of argument is inconsistent with the position where interest money is received, it is held to be of revenue character, and chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. This amount while lying in the same fund cannot acquire the character of a capital receipt. The interest having been treated as revenue receipt on which taxes are paid, it must continue to retain the character of revenue receipt. If the nature of receipt is treated as capital receipt then consistent with the aforesaid approach, no taxes would have been payable on the amount. The corollary is that all expenses incurred in connection with the business are deductible. The legal position, which emerges is that if an assessee carries on business, all that is required to be seen is whether any outlay constitutes an expenditure ‘for the purpose of business’ as used in Section 37(1) of the IT Act. We are also unable to accept the contention of the respondent that the payouts constitute a mere application of income, which does not tantamount to expenditure. The disbursement of non-refundable grants is an integral part of business of the appellant-Corporation as contemplated under Section 13(1) of the NCDC Act and, thus, is for the purpose of its business. The purpose is direct; merely because the grants benefit a third party, it would not render the disbursement as ‘application of income’ and not expenditure. The logical conclusion is that every application of income towards business objective of the appellant-Corporation is a business expenditure and nothing else. The endeavour of the Revenue Department to rely on the judgment in the Sitaldas Tirathdas case (supra) is not appreciable since that was a case dealing with the obligation of an individual who was compelled to apply a portion of his income for the maintenance of persons whom he was under a personal and legal obligation to maintain. The IT Act does not permit any deduction from the total income in such circumstances. We also find really no force in the submission of the Revenue Department that the direct nexus of monies given as outright grants from the taxable interest income cannot be distinctly identified. This is a question of fact. The plea of the respondents is based on a pure conjecture. The judges concluded that we are unable to agree with the indings arrived at by the AO, ITAT and the High Court albeit for different reasons and concur with the view taken by the CIT(A) for the reasons set out hereinbefore. It is, thus, left to this Court as stated above to strike the final blow and allow the appeals, leaving the parties to bear their own costs, while noticing with regret the inordinately long passage of time and the wastage of judicial time on deciding, who is principally right when in either eventuality it benefits the Central Government
35	M/S Himalaya Self Farming Group & Anr Vs. M/S Goyal Feed Suppliers, (2020) 09 SC CK 0037	A Single Bench of the Supreme Court held that under Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated, will have jurisdiction to try the offence, if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account
36	M/S. Exl Careers And Another Vs. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited, (2020) 08 SC CK 0001	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court on a reference by a two Judge Bench opining a perceived conflict between two Division Bench decisions in Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia, (1996) 10 SC CK 0017 and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation  Ltd. vs. Modern Construction & Co., (2013) 10 SC CK 0043 with regard to question of law if a plaint is  returned under Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, for presentation in the court in which it should have been instituted, whether the suit shall proceed de novo or will it continue from the stage where it was pending before the court at the time of returning of the plaint, held that there is no contradiction in the law as laid down in Modern Construction (supra) pronounced after consideration of the law and precedents requiring reconsideration. The Full Bench was of the view that the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if the court where the suit is instituted, is of the view that it has no jurisdiction, the plaint is to be returned in view of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 CPC and the plaintiff can present it before the court having competent jurisdiction. In such a factual matrix, the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the period during which he prosecuted the case before the court having no jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and may also seek adjustment of court fee paid in that court. However, after presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction, the plaint is to be considered as a fresh plaint and the trial is to be conducted de novo even if it stood concluded before the court having no competence to try the same
37	M.C. Mehta Vs. Union Of India & Ors, (2020) 08 SC CK 0048	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.
38	M/S Ambience Infrastructure Private Limited (Now Known As) Ambience Developers And Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Anr Vs. Ambience Island Apartment Owners & Ors, (2020) 08 SC CK 0049	APPEAL AGAIN A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High C A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.ourt dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again. petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again. ST AN ORDER PASSEDBY THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION IN THE COURSE OF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS IS NOT MAINTAINABLE: SC RULED
39	Raghav Gupta Vs. State (NCT Of Delhi) And Another, (2020) 09 SC CK 0010	Full Bench of SC held : That since the relevant information under Rule 32(e) of the Pr A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again. evention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, with regard to the lot/code/batch identification to facilitate it being traced to the manufacturer are available in the barcode and which can be decoded by a barcode scanner, no useful purpose is going to be served by allowing the present prosecution to continue and it will be an abuse of the process of law, causing sheer waste of time, causing unnecessary harassment to the appellant, if the prosecution is allowed to continue.
40	Mukesh Singh Vs. State (Narcotic Branch Of Delhi), (2020) 08 SC CK 0046	Full Bench comprising of Five Judges of the Supreme Court Ruled: In a case under NDPS Act, A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Punjab (2018) 08 SC CK 0033 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.
41	R.Poornima And Ors Vs. Union Of India And Ors., (2020) 09 SC CK 0008	Full Bench of the Supreme comprising of Chief Justice of India, S A Bobde, and Justices AS Bopanna and V. Ramasubramanian dismissed a writ petition filed by eight judicial officers who alleged that the Madras High Court collegium ignored their names and instead recommended their "juniors" for elevation as judges of the High Court by holding that the petitioners' claims were not sustainable. The argument of the Petitioners that it will be discriminatory to allow the benefit of clubbing only to a person who held a judicial office and later became an advocate, did not appeal to the Court. The Judges were of the view that in fact, Article 217(2) does not guarantee any one with the right to be appointed as a judge of the High Court. In a way, a person holding a judicial office is better placed, as he is assured of a career progression (though in a limited sense) after being placed in something like a conveyor belt. There is no such assurance for an advocate. Therefore, the argument of the Petitioners based upon Article 14 did not impress the Judges
42	T.K. David  Vs.  Kuruppampady Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. & Ors, (2020) 10 SC CK 0006	A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the partie A Full Bench of the Supreme Court while dismissing a special leave to appeal against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review Petition filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal held that the rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.s cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr. (supra) has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.

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